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TRADABLE DRIVING RIGHTS IN URBAN AREAS:




Laboratoire d'Economie des Transports




Congestion pricing as a transport demand management measure is difficult to implement
because most of motorists expect a deterioration of their welfare. Tradable driving rights
(TDR), that is allocating quotas of driving rights for free to urban inhabitants, could be a more
acceptable alternative. This mechanism provides also a supplementary incentive to save
whether trips or distance travelled by car, because of the possibility of selling unused rights.
A complete system of TDR is designed in detail, aiming whether at reducing trips or vehicles-
kilometres, in order to control congestion, or the same target modulated on the basis of the
pollutant emission categories of vehicles in order to control atmospheric pollution. An
assessment is carried out on the Lyon urban area, which points at some welfare distributive
issues between motorists and the community, when compared with conventional congestion
pricing.
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Introduction
This paper explores in detail a transport demand management (TDM) measure which could
deal with congestion and pollution caused by automobile traffic, as they are major and
recurring concerns in urban agglomerations all over the world. Taking the economist’s
perspective, these phenomena reflect over-consumption of scarce goods, i.e. the road capacity
in the case of traffic or the clean air in the case of atmospheric pollution: this over-
consumption is the result of the under-pricing of these goods.
Since the seminal work of Marshall and then Pigou (1920), it has been established in standard
economic theory that regulation by pricing is an efficient means of allocating a scarce
resource. This issue is crucial for public goods which are subjected to congestion, for example
in the transport sector where pricing is the proposed means of regulating congestion (Walters
1961; Vickrey 1963). The same rationale applies to the regulation of traffic-related pollution.
This is why, in response to congestion and pollution in urban areas, the TDM measure
favoured by economists is road user charging or congestion charging which are both
implemented by road tolls. In spite of the success of the London Congestion Charging scheme
(since 2003) or the successful experiment in Stockholm (in 2006), social and political
resistance to urban road pricing is still strong.
Although it is accepted that responding to congestion by introducing congestion pricing
increases the welfare of community as a whole, redistribution occurs (Baumol and Oates
1988; Hau 1992). Surplus changes occur in the welfare of different categories of actors from
before to after the introduction. The situation of motorists who forsake the road deteriorates as
they switch to alternatives which they found less beneficial before the introduction of the road
pricing. The situation of most of the motorists who remain on the road also deteriorates, in
spite of higher speeds, as they are subjected to an increase in monetary cost which exceeds the
value of their time saving. The situation of a minority of individuals improves as a result of
their high values-of-time. Finally, the public authorities who collect toll revenues become
wealthier.
So, in general, there is little chance of a congestion charge being accepted, unless motorists
are convinced that the public authorities are benevolent and that they will distribute the
resources collected efficiently and equitably; for example, by a reduction in taxation targeted
at motorists or by financing new transport services which would compensate the first group of
motorists referred to above.
However in the light of these difficulties, another instrument which combines economic
incentives and regulation by quantity, namely marketable or Tradable Permits (TPs), might be
of interest. This category of instruments is part of a wider one, namely transferable permits.
According to a general definition given by O. Godard (OECD 2001), transferable permits
cover a variety of instruments that range from the introduction of flexibility into traditional
regulation to the organization of competitive markets for permits. These instruments have in
common: the setting of quantified physical constraints in the form of obligations, permits,
credits or rights allocated to target groups of agents consuming scarce resources; and the
permission granted to the agents to transfer these quotas between activities, products or places
(offsetting), periods of time (banking) or to other agents (trading, hence “tradable permits”).Page 3
These tradable emissions permits (or quotas
1) are frequently referred to as “pollution rights”,
implying that those who can afford to are allowed to purchase the right to harm the
environment. However, the allocation of emission quotas does not involve the creation of
“pollution rights”, but the restriction of these rights when previously they were unlimited.
Making these quotas “tradable” therefore amounts to introducing flexibility and minimizing
the total cost to the community of reducing emissions. For instance currently the European
Trading Scheme applies tradable quotas of CO2 emissions to about 12,000 energy-intensive
fixed sources within the European Union.
The allocation of quotas for trips or vehicle-kilometres to motorists within a given urban area
has been proposed, with the possibility of these quotas being tradable (Verhoef an al. 1997;
Marlot 1998). An initial allocation would guarantee a free limited amount of travel – which
would improve the acceptability of the mechanism in comparison with conventional road
pricing – while any automobile travel beyond this allocation would be subjected to the
equivalent of a road use charge because of the need to purchase additional permits. A credit-
based congestion pricing mechanism has been proposed by Kockelman and Kalmanje (2005)
by which motorists would receive a monthly allocation in the form of credits (in principle
monetary), which can be used to travel on a road network or within a zone with congestion
charging. The motorists would therefore have nothing to pay if they did not use up their
allocation: beyond this allocation, they would be subjected to the congestion charging regime.
Those who failed to use up their allocation completely would be able to use their credits later
or exchange them for cash.
This paper will deal with the interest of tradable permits in urban travel demand management.
It has been shown theoretically that this type of instrument guarantees the achievement of the
quantitative objective of limiting pollution at minimum cost. Furthermore, this instrument is
particularly appropriate in situations of uncertainty with regard to the response of demand, as
is the case in transport. It also provides a way of separating issues to do with the allocative
efficiency of pollution and congestion abatement efforts from equity issues by means of the
initial allocation of quotas. The paper will then show the types of adverse impact this
instrument may be appropriate for in urban areas and what targets may be set.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the proposals quoted above is detailed enough for it to
be possible to judge whether this type of measure could be applied in urban areas. In this
context, however, “the devil is in the detail”: from the specification of the implementation of
TPs for urban travel demand management, it will be shown which configurations are possible
and relevant. The applicability of this type of instrument will then be demonstrated by
referring to a detailed example, which will then be evaluated.
1  Why are tradable permits of interest in urban areas?
Firstly the theory of tradable permits will be briefly recapped. Given TPs properties,
nuisances within urban areas that are appropriate for TPs implementation will be identified.
Then potential targets will be analysed and finally matched to nuisances previously identified.
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1.1  Theory
The economic theory behind pollution permit markets can be traced back to the work of
Coase (1960) on external costs, followed by that of Dales (1968) on regulating water use, and
the formalization of pollution permit markets by Montgomery (1972).
A system of tradable permits equalizes the marginal costs of reduction between all emission
sources. Under certain assumptions this is a sufficient condition for minimizing the total cost
of achieving a given emissions reduction objective (Baumol and Oates 1988). This result is
obtained independently of the initial allocation of rights: it should be stressed that this makes
it possible to separate the issues of efficiency and equity.
However, Stavins (1995) has shown that when transaction costs are involved – the search for
trading partners, negotiation, decision-making, follow-up and compliance with the rules – the
initial allocation of rights affects the final balance and the total cost of reducing emissions.
The authorities may therefore attempt to reduce these transaction costs, for example by
avoiding finicky regulations or by facilitating the activity of intermediaries between vendors
and purchasers (Hahn and Hester 1989; Foster and Hahn 1995).
The use of transferable permits is not new. They have been used in the fisheries, and in the
fields of construction rights and water pollution. The US “Acid Rain” scheme has been
developed as a large-scale system of tradable sulphur dioxide emission permits (Godard
2000). An appraisal of these experiments has made it possible to identify the principal criteria
of success for such systems and the associated legal and institutional pitfalls (OECD 1998,
see below).
With regard to the quantitative reduction objective, the essential difference between taxes and
permits lies in the fact that in practice the public authorities do not possess full information on
the reduction costs for the different agents. With a permit-based approach, achieving the
quantitative emissions reduction objective is guaranteed, but there is no guarantee with regard
to the level of the actual marginal costs of reduction. On the contrary, in the case of the tax,
the marginal cost of reduction for each agent is fixed by the tax level, but there is no
guarantee with regard to the quantitative level of emissions reduction.
This uncertainty makes it difficult to make a choice, as errors as regards anticipated damage
or the reduction costs for agents, particularly with regard to the distribution of efforts over
time and between agents, may be very costly to the community. Nevertheless, a number of
criteria may be of use when making this choice (Baumol and Oates 1988).
A first criterion for the appropriateness of permits is whether the damage to the environment
is in danger of increasing very rapidly or becoming irreversible when certain emission
thresholds are reached or exceeded. In this case, tradable permits provide a guarantee of
achieving the quantitative emissions limitation objective while minimizing the cost of
evaluation errors in comparison with the tax. The problem of greenhouse gas emissions is a
particularly good example of this situation. Another, in the field of transportation, is the case
in which congestion may, in the short term, result in hyper-congestion which generates large-
scale waste for the community.
A second criterion is whether agents are more sensitive to quantitative signals than price
signals, particularly if the price-elasticity of demand is low in the short or medium term. In
this case again a permit system is more appropriate.
For example, emissions from travel may be reduced by various means: changing driving style,
reducing vehicle-kilometres of travel (by increasing the number of passengers in vehicles,Page 5
reorganizing trips or changing the locations of activities); by changing one’s vehicle or
changing mode in favour of one which consumes less energy. Some of these actions may be
implemented in the short term, while others, such as changing one’s vehicle, changing one’s
place of work or of residence, may take much longer. The result of this is elasticities which
are generally low in the short term and considerably higher in the long term. For example, for
fuel consumption, the price-elasticity values are between –0.3 in the short term
2 and –0.7 in
the long term (Goodwin 1988).
Nevertheless, the choice between taxation and permits requires a case-by-case analysis. A
general solution to this problem of uncertainty with regard to the costs of emissions
reductions has been proposed by Baumol and Oates (1988, pages 74-76), on the basis of an
idea developed by Roberts and Spence.
If the regulator does not put enough permits on the market (for a given year or a given sector),
the free play of the permit market will result in an excessive price. The regulator can then
introduce a payment in full discharge t, on the principle that any polluter has the right to emit
more than the quantity of pollutant permitted by his/her permit by paying the charge t for
these additional emissions. 
3In this case, as soon as the price of permits exceeds the level t, it
is in the interest of polluters to pay the payment in full discharge.
4 The upper bound of the
permit price will therefore be equal to t. This is the hybrid solution which combines the
allocation of permits and a payment in full discharge. It is to be applied when the regulator
must make decisions either with regard to the temporal distribution of efforts (for example
annual objectives) or with regard to the distribution of this effort between the different actors
or sectors.
Furthermore, a third criterion that is an important factor for the effectiveness of TPs is the
heterogeneity of the agents involved in the system. This means that the marginal costs of
abatement must be sufficiently different between agents in order to allow benefits from
trading permits thereby making the market function effectively.
In our context the marginal nuisance reduction cost curves are highly varied, and, in
particular, rise as one moves from urban to suburban and then to rural settings. On two
essential points, namely changes in the locations of activities and changes in transport mode,
the possibilities for action differ very greatly in both nature and degree on the basis of the
residential locations of the individuals in question (urban, suburban, rural). Changes in the
locations of activities in order to reduce the distances between different activities are much
easier to make in urban areas than in suburban or rural locations, as a result of the density of
available activities: changes are possible in the short term for activities where the location
imposes little constraints, such as shopping or leisure; reducing distances between home and
work is easier in a conurbation which provides a high density of job and housing
opportunities. Likewise, the large amount of trip flows which results from the high density of
activity locations means that public transport which provides an alternative to the private car
is more frequently available in urban areas.
Finally, last but not least, in political terms, systems where permits are allocated free of
charge may be seen as a means of avoiding an additional tax, and this can enhance the
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4 This does not apply to the current European Trading Scheme as the penalty is not a payment in full discharge.Page 6
acceptability of the new instrument. With this free allocation, economic agents have a
supplementary incentive to save whether emissions, trips or distance travelled, beyond their
initial allocation of permits because they can sell unused permits and then get tangible reward
for their “virtuous” behaviour.
The main arguments against the use of permits in the transport system are the cost of
administration over a large number of mobile sources and the transactions costs of quotas
transfer. However this issue is similar in the case of electronic road pricing and is now better
addressed, as we will see, thanks to electronic technology which is affordable today.
1.2  Appropriate nuisances for urban areas.
Two main criteria can be used to judge the appropriateness of transferable permit systems –
the ability to impose a quantitative constraint or right within a specified space and time, and
the ability of agents to transfer all or part of these quantitative obligations. These criteria can
be applied initially to the main nuisances associated with transport activity, i.e. greenhouse
gas emissions, regional pollution, noise and congestion.
Space-time equivalents for greenhouse gas emissions occur at the level of the planet, i.e. a ton
of CO2 has the same greenhouse effect irrespective of where and when it is emitted. Thus this
issue is a global matter that goes far beyond the urban scale: the relevant market for such TPs
is a world one and this will not be addressed here. While several proposals address the unitary
vehicle emissions of automakers’ fleets (Wang 1994; Albrecht 2000), a proposal for tradable
fuel permits for drivers has been made by Raux and Marlot (2005).
In other instances such as local or regional air pollutants
5 it is possible to set precise and
measurable targets for aggregate emissions. It is the sum of the individual outputs of agents
that produces the overall output. It is also possible to establish space-time equivalents for air
pollution for which permits can be traded within a geographical area. Since several local or
national health regulations prescribe limits for air pollutant concentrations, this may require a
quantity-based approach.
However, this does not apply to noise whose level does not increase linearly with the number
of individual emitters.
Congestion is another area where limits may be made explicit. If the local policy is not to
increase road capacity, a quantity constraint could be imposed on road traffic. Strictly
speaking, space-time equivalents of congestion cannot be defined very broadly since an hour
lost at a given time in a given location is not equivalent to an hour lost in another area or time.
An efficient scheme would thus restrict trading of driving rights to the users of say a corridor
during a limited time span. However, congestion primarily generates network interaction
effects: congestion on one section of road makes drivers choose another route in order to save
time. Congestion also generates rescheduling interaction effects: congestion at one period
makes some drivers decide to drive earlier or later. Because of these two kinds of interaction
the trading of driving rights could be extended between different locations within a same
urban network and between different times and even days. The equivalence between driving
rights could be fine-tuned by weighting them differently according to the level of congestion.
                                                
5 Primary gases in the case of air pollutants such as CO, SO2, NOx and VOC. Secondary chemical reactions,
such as ozone formation, are not considered.Page 7
Another scarce resource indirectly related to transport activity is public parking space. Here
again if the local policy is to not increase the amount of public parking space, a quantity
constraint could be imposed on its use. However, it is clear that for parking there is no broad
interaction as in the case of congestion. The market would be restricted to small scale areas
(because generally two parking places are only equivalent when they are within walking
range).
1.3  Potential targets for TP implementation in urban areas
On the demand side the congestion and environmental impacts of transportation stem from,
•  technical characteristics of vehicles (energy source, unitary consumption, and pollutant
emissions) and fuels,
•  ownership and intensity of vehicle use (travel as a function of economic and social
trends),
•  land use (location of activities and its impact on distances travelled).
There is potential for controlling nuisances arising from transport in all these areas. However
among these, some are obviously beyond the scope of local urban governments. This is the
case for the regulation of unitary vehicle emissions and fuel standards (for a survey on TP
applications in these areas see Raux 2004).
Car ownership.  In 1990 a scheme of car-ownership rationing involving auctions of a
limited number of certificates of entitlement to purchase a new car was initiated in Singapore.
The number of certificates is determined each year on the basis of traffic conditions and road
capacity and the certificates are issued each month (Koh and Lee 1994). Chin and Smith
(1997) showed control of ownership to be a useful instrument when automobile demand is
inelastic and the social cost function is steep. Compared with price controls, quantity control
reduces the welfare loss arising from any misperception of optimal equilibrium by the
authority.
Car use.  This can be an intermediate solution for controlling congestion. Daganzo
(1995) proposed a congestion reduction scheme based on a “hybrid between rationing and
pricing”. This can be seen as a quota system, without the quotas being transferable. The
system was modelled using the San Francisco Bay Bridge corridor by Nakamura and
Kockelman (2002) who showed the difficulty of finding a combination of tolls and rationing
rates which would benefit all groups of travellers. Other proposals involve setting quotas for
vehicle kilometres travelled (VKT) or trips within a given urban area for motorists that could
be transferred among them, as already referred to in the introduction.
Parking use. When it comes to selecting targets in order to regulate the road externalities
mentioned above, parking rights may also appear to be a promising instrument. However road
externalities are created by vehicles that move while parking policy basically addresses
vehicles that are stationary. For instance an excessively restrictive parking policy in
residential areas would generate additional vehicle traffic as a result of vehicles moving
elsewhere to escape the policy. In areas that are similar to a CBD in which jobs rather than
residences are concentrated, the implementation of parking rights would interfere with or even
duplicate driving rights with the same objective. These drawbacks mean that parking right
markets do not merit further analysis (for a more detailed analysis see Verhoef and al 1997).
Car pollutant emissions.  Some of the atmospheric pollutants result from the composition
of fuels and therefore may be tackled by applying TPs to fuel standards (see above). The usePage 8
of lead as an additive in petrol is being phased out in developing countries and has also been
the subject of a successful application of TPs in the USA (for an overview see Raux 2002a).
Sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions are also covered by standards on the basis of the sulphur
content of fuels.
However, other pollutants are produced by the inefficient burning of fuel in vehicle engines
and ineffective filtering of exhaust gases. This category includes nitrogen oxides (NOx),
hydrocarbons (HC) and particulate matters. For example, in Europe, unitary vehicle emissions
are regulated by the Euro standards which apply to new vehicles put on the market. Table 1
gives the Euro values for private cars (class M1). It shows that between the Euro IV standard
and Euro I standard the permitted levels for HCs and NOx, vary in a ratio of 1 to 10 for petrol
vehicles and 1 to 3 for diesel vehicles. Particulate emissions standards have so far only been
imposed on diesel vehicles (a ratio of 1 to 6 between Euro IV and Euro I) but the Euro V














Euro I 1993 0.97 (HC+NOx) 0.97 (HC+NOx)
Euro II 1997 0.5 (HC+NOx) 0.5 (HC+NOx)
Euro III 2001 0.20 0.15
Euro IV 2006 0.10 0.08
M1 diesel
vehicles
Euro I 1993 0.97 (HC+NOx) 0.97 (HC+NOx) 0.14
Euro II 1997 0.7 - 0.9 (HC+NOx) 0.7 - 0.9 (HC+NOx) 0.08 - 0.1
Euro III 2001 0.56 (HC+NOx) 0.56 (HC+NOx) 0.05
Euro IV 2006 0.30 (HC+NOx) 0.30 (HC+NOx) 0.025
Source: Hugrel and Joumard 2006
Table 1: European road vehicle emissions standards
Standards of this type can thus provide a basis for regulating the intensity of vehicle use with
reference to their pollutants emissions class. In practical terms, the number of rights required
to use a vehicle could, all other things being equal, be varied according to the vehicle’s
emissions category. It is this type of modulation which was used in the Ecopoints system
which was applied to lorries crossing Austria until the end of 2006 (for a survey of this
experiment, see Raux 2002a).
Land-use. In scattered settings, public transport is not viable so trips are usually made by car
and distances travelled are longer. Land use is generally managed through regulation,
however, there have been proposals for applying tradable permits to real estate developers on
the basis of the travel volumes that their projects will generate (Ottensmann 1998).
However, to do this, it would be necessary to identify traffic generators (for example,
shopping centres, industrial or small business zones) and it poses many market organizationPage 9
problems, in particular with regard to minimizing transaction costs and making trading
possible, not only within a conurbation but also between different conurbations.
1.4  Matching nuisances reductions to targets
Targeting VKT with an adjustment according to emission category may be particularly
appropriate for local and regional pollutant emissions, (see Table 2). Encouraging the use of
less polluting combustion engine technologies is a way of reducing harmful tailpipe exhaust
emissions per kilometre driven. Targeting only VKT or trips has the drawback of rationing
travel, while being less optimally linked to pollutant emissions, since there is no incentive to






End user VKTs or
trips
Land use Car ownership
Local / regional
pollution xxx x xx x
Congestion xxx xx x
From x = low to xxx = high level of appropriateness
Table 2: Appropriateness of TP targets for different nuisances in urban areas
Regarding congestion, the most efficient and decentralized incentive is on end-user VKT (or
even trips on specific corridors or through an area). End-users as the final decision-makers
can modify their travel choices, activity locations, or choice of vehicle. However this has the
same basic drawback of rationing travel (this will be addressed below).
For both nuisances, regional pollution and congestion, controlling land use is in principle an
attractive way of reducing distances travelled, but it is controversial: it has still not been
proven that it is possible to reverse the tendency to travel longer distances by compacting
locations again. However the spatial concentration of activities yields more opportunities for
cost-efficient transport alternatives that are less energy consuming such as mass transit.
Car ownership is another indirect way of controlling car travel but the linkage with actual use
and hence congestion or pollutant emissions, is very crude.
From now on we will develop the specification of the implementation of TPs for urban
transport demand management.
2  Specifications
This section will outline specifications for the implementation of tradable permit markets for
urban transport demand management.
The purpose is twofold: to limit the increase on the one hand of vehicle-kilometres travelled
(VKT), particularly during peak periods, and on the other hand of atmospheric pollutant
emissions from vehicles. The ideal, from an efficiency point of view, would be to target VKTPage 10
with the ability to make distinctions on the basis of time and space (congestion) and the type
of vehicle (atmospheric pollutant emissions).
However, the limited possibilities of affordable technology mean that a compromise must be
accepted with regard to this objective. We shall begin, therefore, by taking stock of
technological possibilities at the present time and the near future. This will be followed by an
examination of the conditions which a tradable permit system must satisfy in order to be
implemented successfully.
2.1  Existing and conceivable technologies and their costs
The most mature technology at the present time is roadside Electronic Toll Collection (ETC).
This is based on an on-board electronic tag which uses Dedicated Short Range
Communications (DSRC) to dialogue with roadside readers. The dialogue between the two, in
the most simple version, is used to identify the vehicle and transmit information about the
transaction to a central computer in order to invoice the owner of the vehicle.  This procedure
requires prior registering of both vehicles and drivers. The roadside reader must also be fitted
with a video enforcement system (VES) in order to recognise the number plate of those
vehicles for which the transaction does not succeed (because of fraud or for other reasons).
A more sophisticated version involves debiting on the fly a preloaded smartcard or credit card
that is inserted in the on-board unit (OBU). Objections with regard to the protection of
privacy can be overcome by allowing the anonymous purchase of cards which have already
been loaded with units.
A system of this last type is used for the Singapore Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) system
which was introduced in September 1998 to replace the manual toll payment scheme in
operation since 1975. This covered the central business district known as the Restricted Zone
(RZ). The new system covers the RZ and a set of major expressways. To begin with, in 1998,
32 gantries were installed and 674,000 In-vehicle Units (IU) were distributed free of charge
with a total investment cost of US$ 114 million (Menon and Chin  2004). Drivers use
preloaded CashCards that they can buy anonymously in retail shops and ATMs. The
CashCard is inserted into the IU and debited at each crossing through a gantry. Annual
operating costs stand at US$ 9 million for roughly 6 million daily transactions in 2003. The
average monthly level of fraud is less than 0.5% of all transactions. The owners of new
vehicles must now purchase their IUs at a cost of US$ 69 (Menon 2000).
A second type of toll collection technology, based on a vehicle positioning system (VPS) that
uses satellites (the international GPS system or the European Galileo system), is currently
emerging. A well-known example is the TollCollect programme for lorries on the German
motorway network. This technology is based on an on-board unit (OBU) which contains a
GPS positioning device which dialogues with a constellation of satellites. This type of
technology represents the most effective road toll collection system in that it can track the
movements of vehicles so the exact distance travelled can be charged, at a rate which may be
varied according to the location and the time of passage.
Although from the technical point of view this system requires no roadside equipment,
currently it would nevertheless be extremely costly to implement. For example, the estimated
cost of the OBU is between €200 and €400 (including installation cost). Furthermore, in order
to optimize the cost of the system, all the vehicles which can potentially be charged must be
included in the system at the outset: complex and costly manual procedures which duplicate
the electronic system are required to process occasional users. Lastly, the possibility ofPage 11
permanently tracking vehicles raises obvious issues with regard to protecting the privacy of
car drivers. However, it is probable that these initial problems will be overcome and
ultimately acceptable and cost-efficient technologies will be developed.
On the basis of these technical possibilities and their present-day costs, two possible types of
application can be envisaged:
•  the first application would use well-proven technology based on roadside ETC (RS-ETC)
and would aim to cover all motorized vehicle trips in the zone covered by the traffic
restriction scheme;
•  the second application would be based on the satellite vehicle positioning technology
(VPS-ETC) and would aim to cover all the vehicle-kilometres travelled within the zone
covered by the scheme.
2.2  The conditions for implementing an emissions permit market
On the basis of experience of emissions permit markets and summaries that have been
conducted elsewhere (cf. OECD 1997 1998) the main criteria for the success of such systems
can be listed (see Box 1). These criteria will serve as a reference for the design and appraisal
of the proposal which will be made below.
In order to design an emissions permit market, a series of questions, briefly set out below,
must be answered.
The first relates to the specification of the unit to be traded. In view of the stated objectives,
this will consist of driving rights (DR). It must be possible to make distinctions with regard to
these driving rights on the basis of space and time (congestion) and according to the vehicle’s
emissions levels (pollution). The mechanism for doing this and its parameters must then be
specified.
The second question relates to specifying the entities which will hold and trade quotas and be
obliged to return them on the basis of their emissions. This can consist of motorists or
inhabitants.
Box 1
The criteria for the success of tradable emissions permits
1.  Broad agreement is required on the need to act and the effectiveness of the system with
regard to improving the environment and its lower costs in comparison to other systems or
solutions.
2.  The system must be simple and clear: it is necessary to draw up simple rules, create
market boundaries and a specified measurable and verifiable unit of exchange and clearly
identify participants.
3.  The participants must be able to afford the foreseeable price of the permit in practice.
4.  There must be a sufficient number of participants for the market to function.
5.  Marginal depollution costs must differ sufficiently for gains to be made as a result of
trading.
6.  Transaction costs must be limited.
7.  Tracking, checks and penalties must have credibility.Page 12
8.  Certainty is necessary with regard to the mechanisms for allocating permits and their
validity in the future.
9.  The system must take account of equity and, more generally, social and political
acceptability: the introduction of new pricing instruments is usually perceived as
inequitable, so these aspects must be included from the outset with any corrective
compensation measures that are necessary.
The third question is how these quotas will be allocated. Should they be allocated free of
charge? If not, the entities affected by the scheme will have to buy all the permits they need
on the market: in the event of the total available quantity on the market being small, it is
equivalent to setting up a quota auction. Economically, this is the most efficient solution as it
obliges actors to reveal their preferences. It is also consistent with the polluter-pays principle
and creates a usable financial resource. However, as with congestion charging it immediately
increases the financial burden on the actors involved: this would eliminate the essential
acceptability advantage that driving rights could have over congestion charging.
Consequently, at least some of the quotas would have to be allocated free of charge as a
visible and immediate compensation in order to facilitate this instrument’s acceptability.
If the quotas are allocated free of charge, to whom should they be allocated and with what
distribution method? The problem is that although in theory these methods do not threaten the
effectiveness of the instrument, they ultimately determine the financial burden on the
participating entities.  Will these entities be vehicle owners or inhabitants? Choosing the latter
would amount to compensating inhabitants for the consequences of congestion and pollution.
This would involve those who travel little, pedestrians and public transport users and not only
motorists, which would improve the acceptability of the scheme.
Other issues relate to the period of validity of the quotas and the quota payment obligations.
These parameters must be fixed in a way that maintains incentives to reduce consumption of
driving rights, particularly during congested periods, and to reduce pollutant emissions.
The principal characteristics of the operation of the permit market must also be specified, that
is to say how the transactions will take place, how much flexibility will be allowed to
individual holders who trade rights, what role, if any, could be granted to financial
intermediaries other than the regulating authority.
Last, two questions must receive particular attention. The first is the possibility of keeping the
transactions anonymous, which is an obvious factor for the acceptability of a new control
mechanism. The second is how to deal with “border effects”, in particular the management of
occasional users and the anticipation of unforeseen behaviours which might undermine the
effectiveness of the programme.
These points are covered in the following proposal.
3  A system of tradable driving rights for urban areas
From the previous specifications, detailed aspects are now discussed. Firstly the unit to be
traded is defined with the computation of driving rights according to congestion and pollution
levels, followed by the issue of total quantity to allocate for free. Then successively aspects of
market and quotas trading, period of validity of quotas, tracking and checks of driving rights
consumption and finally the compatibility with other regulations, are analysed.Page 13
3.1  The unit to be traded
The unit to be traded would be the driving right (DR). In the RS-ETC system, the unit of
account for DRs would be the trip, but in the VPS-ETC system the unit of account for DRs
would be the VKT. The users would therefore pay a total number of DRs, i.e. either trips or
vehicle-kilometres of travel.
An agency in charge of transportation in the conurbation and receiving its powers from the
local elected authorities would fix the parameters of the programme. To do this, the agency
would make use of a survey system including, for example, Household Travel Surveys and
traffic count data (for example from cordon traffic surveys).
The agency would specify the zones (on the basis of population density), the peak and off-
peak periods, as well as the vehicle emission classes (using, for example, the Euro standards).
These parameters would be used to compute the weighting of the DRs which would be
charged to drivers. The DRs would be weighted on the basis of the level of congestion, which
provides an indication of excess pollutant emissions, but also on the basis of the size of the
vehicle in passenger car units (PCUs) and its atmospheric pollutant emission class.
All the vehicles entering and travelling within the zone covered by the scheme would be liable
to return DR quotas to the agency on the basis of a computation method as described below.
M1 petrol car Euro I 10 Zone with low population
density
1




Euro IV 1 Off-peak period 1




Table 3: Weighting factors for driving rights
Table 3 sets out some weightings which could be applied. With respect to pollutants,
beginning with the vehicle that pollutes the least (the Euro IV M1 petrol passenger car) and
on the basis of HC + NOx emissions, the multiplication factor can be deduced from the data
in Table 1, i.e. between 1 and 10.
It is also possible to establish a weighting factor for congestion, making a distinction between
the zone of travel (low/high density) and the time of travel (off peak periods / peak periods) as
a result of the increase in the level of congestion in these zones and the larger population that
is exposed to nuisance in them.
For example, a Euro IV petrol vehicle would use DRs at a rate of 1 DR per trip (or VKT)
during an off peak period and in a sparsely populated zone. In the case of a Euro IV diesel
vehicle, three times more DRs than this would be used. The same Euro IV diesel vehicle
would have to pay in all 12 times more DRs during a peak period and in a dense zone. Still
taking as a reference the Euro IV petrol vehicle travelling in an off-peak period and a sparselyPage 14
populated zone, the multiplying factor would increase to 40 for a Euro 1 vehicle travelling in
a peak period in a densely populated zone. This may seem excessive, but these weighting
coefficients have only been given as an example. Weightings must be adjusted precisely on
the basis of the estimated costs of congestion and pollution.
These weightings obviously assume the capacity to differentiate between vehicles actual use
on the basis of their Euro category (see “Tracking and Checking” below).
3.2  Allocation
The proportion of the DRs allocated to the inhabitants of the urban zone would be estimated
initially by the survey system described above. These DRs would be distributed free of charge
equally between all the inhabitants. There would be no need to certify this estimate as being
precise (indeed, from a statistical standpoint, this would be impossible), it would merely serve
as a basis for the elected representatives to decide what they think it is fair to allocate free of
charge to inhabitants. Each inhabitant would have a DR account with the agency, and this
account would initially be credited with this free allocation.
The DRs which are not allocated would be sold by the agency. This means those motorists
who live outside the conurbation and business users (for example, those making deliveries for
firms, tradesmen, doctors, etc), those making through trips, and those inhabitants of the urban
zone who have used up their remaining DRs would be able to purchase DRs. The sale of these
rights by the agency would resemble conventional congestion charging.
The agency would vary the total number of DRs allocated and sold over time: this total could
be maintained constant if priority were given to limiting traffic, or it could be increased if the
economic development of the conurbation so required. In this connection, the level of demand
for the rights that are put on sale would provide a good indicator of user preferences and the
need to increase transport supply.
As DRs are allocated to individuals but used by vehicles, there is an obvious incentive for
carpooling.
3.3  The market and quota trading
The trading of rights can take two possible forms:
•  The more ambitious option would consist of a full market, those rights which are not
allocated freely being auctioned. Financial intermediaries (banks) could be involved in
trading and then offer rights to their clients. These auctions would produce an equilibrium
price at which private individuals holding unused rights could sell them. For safety
purposes, in order to avoid an excessive rise in the event of an error when evaluating the
total number of rights to be put on sale, the agency would fix a maximum price for rights
at which it would sell them.
•  The less ambitious option would try not to leave the management of driving rights entirely
to the market: rights which are not allocated free of charge would be sold at a price fixed
by the agency and at which the agency would buy back unused rights.
However, nothing would prevent a holder of unused rights from transferring them (or even
giving them free of charge) to an acquaintance. In practical terms, this would involve simply
notifying the agency that rights have been transferred from one account to another (forPage 15
example by making an electronic transfer on the Internet). Obviously, there would be no black
market as sale and purchase would be unrestricted.
Likewise, small business users would be able to use the rights allocated to them as residents
of a conurbation for either their private or their business trips. Last, it might be possible for
families to combine the rights accounts of their members to form a joint account to which the
DR smartcards of all the motorists in the family would be linked.
3.4  Period of validity
At the start of the scheme, each resident in the urban zone would have a free allocation which
is equivalent to several weeks of rights quotas, so that from the outset they would each be able
to use the rights they are allocated variably from one week to another. Next, at the start of
each week, the resident would be allocated rights quotas for a period of seven days, thus
giving the rights holder the flexibility to distribute them over the week as he/she wishes from
the outset. These rights would be valid for one year after they have been allocated. Unused
rights could be sold back to the agency at any time, even after their validity has expired.
The balance of a resident’s DR account should never be negative. Put another way, as soon as
a resident’s rights have been completely used up, he or she would have to buy the necessary
additional rights at the market price.
The risk of over-consumption of rights at certain periods during the day, the week or the
month would be quite limited for a number of reasons. First, the rate at which DRs are used
up increases with the level of congestion and pollution: there would be an opportunity cost for
each right, those used up during a congested period will not be used elsewhere or at another
time. Next, using these rights would be associated with another (transport) expenditure to
perform an activity whose net utility would have to be positive in order for it to take place.
Last, as the agency would be able to buy back unused rights, residents would have no
incentive to make additional trips to use up their rights.
3.5  Tracking, checks
The DR collection system would be as described below, either taking the form of RS-ETC or
VPS-ETC.
The electronic smart tags would be provided free of charge to motorists in order to encourage
electronic transactions as much as possible, thus easing traffic flow through the checkpoints.
This equipment would identify a type of vehicle and, in particular, its Euro class. It would
permit the automatic debiting of the required number of DRs from a smartcard while vehicles
are travelling.
The DR smartcards would be distributed free of charge to those who choose to have the on-
board equipment. The cards would be credited with the DRs allocated to or purchased by the
motorist.
In the RS-ETC system, the number of vehicle detection gantries should be minimised by
using natural barriers (for example, rivers or railway lines) and the road network topology (i.e.
single ways).
In order to improve the acceptability of the scheme, a maximum daily number of DRs to be
debited would be set, following the example of the maximum daily charge in the Stockholm
congestion charging trial.Page 16
Coping with occasional users.  This is the Achille’s heel of electronic toll collection
systems. With the RS-ETC system potential malfunctions or violations must be detected with
the help of video enforcement systems (VES) as previously quoted. The VES can be used to
detect vehicles non equipped with on-board equipment either because they only drive
occasionally in the zone (for example, visitors) or because they refuse to have on-board
equipment of any type. This was the policy of the Stockholm congestion charging trial. While
having being detected, the driver can pay the charge after his/her driving within a given
period (for instance 2 weeks as in the Stockholm case). The payment and recovery mechanism
for the invoice could be similar to that in the London or Stockholm scheme (unsolicited
payment by Internet, telephone or in shops before a potential fine and recovery by a
specialized firm).
In order to minimise the amount of such potential a financial incentive can be offered to
register and get the on-board equipment. This incentive could be that the regular fee for
driving through the scheme area for one day while not being registered would be the
equivalent of the maximum daily number of DRs debited applicable to registered users (see
above).
In the near future, a generalisation of interoperable on-board equipment is to be expected on
vehicles, such as the Norway-originated Autopass system which is extending to other
Scandinavian countries. That is to say a vehicle having contracted with an operator of an
urban area would be recognised in another urban area. Information about the vehicle’s Euro
class could be retrieved on the basis of it registration number. It is possible that in the near
future all vehicles will be fitted with tamperproof RFID tags containing all this information,
as this has already been proposed as an anti-car theft measure.
However, in the VPS-ETC with a satellite-based vehicle positioning system, the management
of occasional users would be more difficult, as it would require either the satellite tracking
system to be duplicated by roadside gantries or manual checks. The resulting possibility of
fraud or at least evasion could be seen as unfair by users with vehicles equipped with an
OBU. A VPS-ETC system is only of interest if in the future all the vehicles are equipped with
positioning systems which would be capable of interacting with the road pricing system. This
would require technical harmonisation of the ETC systems in all urban areas and for the entire
vehicle fleet.
Finally, it should be stressed that the privacy concern is adequately addressed with an RS-
ETC system such as the one used in Singapore (see above). This is not yet the case with VPS-
ETC.
3.6  Compatibility with existing or future regulations
What is proposed would be an additional system and there would be no redundancy with a
tradable fuel permit system (see above) which would not be restricted to urban zones. The
objective of this system is in fact different as it aims to limit CO2 emissions which are directly
proportional to the consumption of fossil fuel.
TDRs would, of course, replace conventional congestion charging. Existing parking control
systems could, however, be maintained.Page 17
4  An example of implementation
We give an overview of a proposed scheme that would be implemented in the Lyon urban
area. This scheme is then assessed with computation of various economic surpluses.
4.1  Practical implementation
The Lyon conurbation (1,200,000 inhabitants) has a typical European urban form in which the
central zones contain approximately half the inhabitants and jobs with an average population
density of 9,000 inhabitants per km². However, like similar agglomerations Lyon is subject to
urban sprawl, with both population and jobs having a long term tendency to move into the
suburbs and the outskirts.
The implementation of DRs would be based in a first step on an RS-ETC system as described
above which would regulate the number of trips. For the sake of simplicity in the first years of
the scheme no particular weighting would be applied to DRs according to Euro standard or to
peak / off-peak period of driving. However the detection and debiting of DRs would be
effective only in periods of higher traffic, for instance between 6h and 19h from Monday to
Friday: this would be a proxy for weighting DRs according to congestion.
The main difficulty is then to detect car “trips”
6 since traffic would be monitored only by
detection of vehicles when passing a gantry. The solution would be to define the “trip” as the
period of one hour of car use
7 after the first detection by a gantry. That is to say, if the car is
detected again within this period of one hour, it would be considered as the same trip and no
supplementary DR would be debited. Trips of more than one hour duration would be longer
distance trip and then it would be fair to debit one more DR.
Table 4 gives daily average number of trips for all individuals and workers (inhabitants of the
Lyon area), and a distinction with the level of income,
8 according to data from the 1995
Household Travel Survey in Lyon.
All individuals (5 and over) Workers
% as a driver as a
passenger
total % as a driver as a
passenger
total
Low income 35.2 1.13 0.44 1.57 24.2 2.35 0.27 2.62
Medium income 31.8 1.68 0.48 2.16 34.7 2.65 0.29 2.93
High income 33.1 2.13 0.53 2.66 41.1 3.03 0.30 3.33
Total 100 1.63 0.48 2.12 100 2.73 0.29 3.02
Source: Household Travel Survey, Lyon (1995)
Table 4: Daily average number of trips by car (HTS Lyon 1995)
                                                
6 The option of driving days rights is dismissed because it is not sufficiently linked to travel intensity and period.
7 This period of one hour looks sufficient given the current traffic conditions in Lyon.
8 This is an income per adult equivalent unit, in order to take into account differences in size and structure
between households. Low income stand for income less than 886 € per month, medium income between 886 and
1344 €, high income beyond 1344 € (see Nicolas and al. 2003).Page 18
In order to avoid too much harmful immediate effect on car mobility when it is used to reach
one’s workplace, the free allocation of driving rights would for instance initially amount to 3
DRs (i.e. 3 trips) per working day. According to this allocation, as shown in Table 4 on
average low income workers would have rights to sell, medium income workers would be
neutral, while high income workers would have to buy additional rights if they want to
maintain their level of car mobility for work purposes. Such data show that the scheme would
be progressive in relation with income level.
This kind of initial allocation would from the start of the scheme initiate a market between
those who would have to buy additional rights and those who would sell unused rights, even
if the total allocation would be large enough to cope with current total car trips. This initial
allocation would improve the acceptability of the first years scheme implementation.
However, after this first period, the agency in charge of allocation of DRs would announce a
step-by-step decrease of the individual free allocation each year.
When the VPS-ETC is feasible and affordable then the trip DR scheme would be replaced by
a distance DR scheme.
4.2  Assessment
Assessment method.  Our appraisal is based on the use of a strategic travel demand model
developed for the Lyon conurbation in 1997. This model has a conventional architecture
consisting of five submodels (Raux 2002b). These are: 1) zonal trip generation, estimated on
the basis of socio-demographic and economic trends; 2) the spatial distribution of trip origins
and destinations, based on a gravity model whose deterrence function varies according to the
generalized cost of inter-zonal trips; 3) interzonal modal choice, which estimates the
proportion of trips that use walking or bike and then distributes the motorized modes between
public transport and the private car using an aggregate logit procedure; 4) transformation of
the daily origin-destination matrices into peak period matrices by applying factors based on
past observations; the four above submodels have been calibrated and operate in parallel for
four types of trip purpose – work, shopping and services, education and other purposes. The
last submodel (5) uses an iterative procedure to allocate the trips for all purposes to the
different routes, and places them in competition with each other, and also with through and
inbound / outbound traffic.
The model was calibrated on the basis of three household surveys (1976, 1986, 1995), which
were conducted during a period when travel costs, particularly for private cars, were
continually falling either because of an improvement in roads or a reduction in the price of
fuel relative to purchasing power. This has resulted in greater travel distances which are
integrated within the model by means of the origin and destination spatial distribution
submodel.
However, introducing area road pricing or tradable driving rights into the agglomeration
would break this trend with numerous impacts: changes in route in the case of different tolls
for different routes, changes in trip times in response to peak period pricing, changes in travel
mode, changes in destination when trip purposes allow it, and medium- and long-term effects
on the location of activities (jobs, shops, services, housing). The last changes would result
ultimately in other changes in trip destinations. The net direction and magnitude of these last
effects are difficult to estimate, and this uncertainty reflects our limited current knowledgePage 19
about the interactions between the conditions of transport and urbanization. For this reason,
assessment has been limited to a short-term horizon.
In order to effectively isolate these short-term effects, we decided to freeze the socio-
economic situation (population, jobs and their locations, income, etc.) and the spatial
distribution of trips (origins and destinations) in 1995, the model’s base year. Consequently,
only two out of five submodels are “active”, the modal choice model
9 and the route
assignment model
10: a deterioration in the conditions of travel by private car can lead to a
transfer to other modes or a change of route, and vice-versa. Lastly, the model computes the
travel conditions on the road network during the morning peak hour (7-8 a.m. in 1995). In
brief, the trip volumes for each origin-destination pair remain constant, all that changes is the
modal choice and the route taken between zones.
The assessment of DRs scenarios will be performed with reference with a conventional road
pricing alternative. Figure 1 shows a convenient approximation of the demand curve (or
willingness to pay), that is to say change in demanded quantities (vehicle trips, on the x-axis
of this graph) as a function of the price (on the y-axis). The current price (P0) corresponds to
the average generalised cost already borne by the driver (monetary cost of using the car plus
time spent in travelling). To this is added the congestion fee or the price of the permit,










Figure 1: The effects of congestion pricing or tradable driving rights on travel demand
The transition from a price P0 to a price P1 will result in a modification of behaviours, which
will in turn reduce car trips demand, from Q0 to Q1. The resulting surpluses will be as follows:
                                                
9 For the trips made by residents of the conurbation.
10 For the trips made by both residents of the conurbation, and through and inbound / outbound traffic.Page 20
•  S1 represents the loss in consumer surplus resulting, for example, from the reduction of
car trip-making or the purchase of a less polluting but more expensive car: this loss is net
of the cost previously supported (Q0-Q1).P0.
•  S2 represents, in the case of congestion pricing, the gain in local government’s surplus that
results from the newly congestion fee paid by the drivers, i.e. (Q1.t). S2 is a loss for
drivers.
11 In the case of permits, local government is no longer involved and S2 represents,
for holders of permits, the gains that result from the sale of permits or the losses that result
from the purchase of permits.
The surplus for drivers is (S1+S2). The surplus for local government is (S2) when the
congestion fee is applied. In addition, as we are only comparing congestion pricing with
tradable driving rights, we take no account of the gains in congestion, accidents, local
pollution and noise which would result from a reduction in traffic, as these gains are similar in
both cases. Moreover in our exercise the overall surplus change is the same when comparing
congestion pricing and permits. The differences between the two instruments lie in the
distributions of surplus between categories of motorists and between motorists and the local
government.
Results. An assessment of road pricing scenarios was conducted in a previous study on
the Lyon conurbation using observation data from 1995 (Raux and Andan 2002). These
scenarios assume that, by using appropriate electronic toll technology (for example the RS-
ETC system described above), it would be possible to distinguish the vehicles belonging to
residents of the conurbation from those of non-residents. The first group would pay an area
pricing in the form of a fixed daily payment covering all trips and the second would be
subjected to a first cordon toll when entering the conurbation and a second cordon toll when
entering the central zone. The scenario which most reduces the total traffic in the conurbation
(a 5% reduction in the 2.6 million daily vehicle trips of which 8% are made by vehicles from
outside the conurbation), is that in which the area pricing for residents’ vehicles is €3 per day
and the toll for entering either of the two cordons is also €3 per day.
If motorists pay an average charge of €0.75 per trip (individuals make an average of 4 private
car trips per day), we can deduce that the loss in surplus for drivers S1 is approximately €10
million per year. The surplus S2, i.e. the revenue from the 95% of trips that continue to be
made, would then be €370 million per year.
With the implementation of TDRs, if it is assumed that the quantitative objective is to reduce
traffic by 5% in relation to the current situation, the loss in surplus for drivers S1 would be
unchanged in relation to the situation with a toll.
H o w e v e r ,  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  T D R s  m o s t  o f  t h e surplus S2 would be redistributed between
motorists instead of becoming revenue for the transport authority. A small proportion of this
surplus, corresponding to the 8% of external traffic without a free allocation of TDRs, would
constitute revenue for the transport authority, amounting to €28 million. If all of the TDRs
were allocated freely, €342 million would be spent on DRs or transferred between motorists
wishing to travel by car within the conurbation.
                                                
11 (S1+S2) is of course offset by the suppression of the deadweight loss previously due to congestion.Page 21
5  Barriers to implementation and how to overcome them
Barriers to the implementation of TDR are mostly the same as for conventional urban road
pricing as the purpose of both instruments is to regulate transport externalities and hence
travel intensity. These barriers have already been identified in the literature (see Jones, 1998;
Schlag and Teubel, 1997). Firstly the opinion must agree for the need for action and that
depends on the level of concern for congestion or for environmental degradation originating
from transport activity. The opinion must also be convinced that alternative solutions such as
public transport improvements, park and ride schemes or policy encouraging alternative travel
by bikes or walking, are not sufficient when congestion or pollution are reaching too high
levels. Besides this indicates that TDR like urban road pricing is not a panacea that should be
implemented in all urban areas. Building a broad agreement for action and “radical” policy
needs communication and debates.
The technical or practical feasibility of regulating vehicles with TDR has been addressed
previously when analysing the already implemented electronic road pricing in Singapore.
There is however a risk that economic feasibility could be undermined by an excessive cost of
implementation and operation (see for instance the controversy about the net surplus of
London congestion charging scheme due to the high cost of monitoring and collecting
revenues: Prud’homme and Bocarejo, 2005; Raux, 2005). Here again figures quoted above
regarding the Singapore implementation of ERP indicate that costs can be made moderate.
The issue of legal feasibility of regulating urban car travel with TDR is broadly analogous to
the one for area or cordon road pricing. The national legal framework must be made
compatible if needed, which is not yet achieved in many countries including France.
One of the main barrier to implementation of regulation appealing to the market is equity
concerns, summarised as “the poor won’t be able to travel any more”. At this point there is a
noticeable difference between TDR and road pricing, since part of the TDR can be allocated
for free: this is a guarantee for a minimal travel capability which is not affected by the pricing
of rights on the market, even for the drivers not willing or being able to abandon their car.
Regarding acceptability this free allocation is an advantage for TDR upon road pricing.
Geographical equity is also a crucial issue when drivers living inside the charging zone get
discount fees like in London congestion charging scheme, or travel for free if they stay inside
the cordon like in Oslo or Stockholm. In these two latter cases this issue has been resolved by
agreements between local governments of the charging and surrounding areas about the
allocation of revenues from pricing. A similar agreement must be reached in the case of TDR
since rights would be allocated for free to the inhabitants of the regulated zone and revenues
would come from rights purchased by drivers living outside the regulated zone.
Conclusion
It has been shown that driving rights markets have three advantages over urban road pricing
schemes which make them particularly appropriate for limiting congestion and the pollution
caused by urban traffic. The first advantage is the guarantee that a predefined quantitative
objective will be attained, whether this involves limiting congestion in the short term or not
exceeding certain atmospheric pollution thresholds. The second advantage is that it separates
issues of allocative efficiency from issues of equity: the possibility of maintaining a part ofPage 22
travel “free” besides the part that is subject to a charge is an obvious factor that makes it more
acceptable than conventional urban road pricing. The third advantage is that with this free
allocation, individuals have a supplementary incentive to save whether trips or distance
travelled by car, beyond their initial allocation of driving rights because they can sell unused
rights and then get tangible reward for their “virtuous” behaviour.
More generally, the allocation of TDRs creates a kind of rights on the urban rent which are
shared among the inhabitants rather than being captured by the local government. These
characteristics make TDRs essentially different from conventional urban road pricing even
with special discounts for some users.
Analysis of potential applications for managing urban travel demand has revealed two priority
targets: the first is trips or VKT, in order to control congestion; the second is the same target
modulated on the basis of the pollutant emission categories of vehicles in order to control
atmospheric pollution.
The assessment of ETC technologies has shown that one of them, that combines on-board and
roadside equipment, is proven by effective implementation with acceptable cost in several
cities. Another technology which may be considered, but more for the future, is based on the
combination of a universally installed satellite-based vehicle positioning system and a toll
collection system.
Based on these technologies and objectives with regard to limiting congestion and the
environmental harm caused by urban traffic, the design of a system of tradable driving rights
is possible. Quite a detailed design has been performed, which includes border effects such as
the processing of occasional users, that makes it reasonable to envisage its application in an
urban agglomeration.
Conventional congestion charging involves a transfer from motorists to the community, which
is able to use the revenue as it judges best, while the free allocation of tradable driving rights
confines a certain proportion of the transfers to within the group of motorists and population.
This loss of revenue for the public authorities represents the price that must be paid for the
acceptability of congestion charging, and this price may seem very high.
A possible strategy would be to introduce a traffic capping mechanism and keep this
quantitative level constant from year to year. As demand increases with the growth of the
agglomeration, purchases of the additional TDRs which are required would provide revenue
for the transport authority. Thus transport users would reveal their preferences, providing a
signal to the community to invest in a cost-efficient manner in developing the supply of
transport, but not necessarily road transport.
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